欧洲议会2013年3月14日关于欧盟-中国关系的决议(2012/2137(INI))



5/06/2013

对华援助协会翻译  2013年05月06日

欧洲议会2013年3月14日关于欧盟-中国关系的决议(2012/2137(INI))

欧洲议会,

 

- 考虑到1975年5月欧盟和中国建立的外交关系,

 

- 考虑到和中国关系的主要法律框架,即1985年5月签署的欧洲共同市场-中国之间的贸易与经济合作协定。此协定包含了经济和贸易关系以及欧盟-中国之间的合作计划,

 

- 考虑到自2007年以来一直在谈判的一个新伙伴与合作协定,

 

考虑到2003年发起的欧盟-中国战略伙伴关系,

 

- 考虑到1994年正式建立的有结构的欧盟-中国政治对话以及2010年建立的在战略和外交政策上的高层战略对话;

 

- 考虑到2006年10月24日欧洲委员会给欧洲理事会以及欧洲议会的叫做“欧盟 – 中国:更紧密的伙伴、越来越多的责任的通讯(COM(2006)0631),

 

- 考虑到欧洲委员会的,2003年10月13日欧洲理事会通过的叫做“一个成熟的伙伴关系:欧盟-中国关系中共同分享的利益和挑战” (COM(2003)0533),

- 考虑到欧洲理事会的东亚政策指南,

 

- 考虑到2006年12月11-12日叫做“欧盟-中国战略伙伴”的一般性事务和对外关系理事会的结论,

 

- 考虑到2007年-2013年欧洲委员会对中国的战略文件,2011年-2013年的每年多次的陈述计划,2010年中期战略文件的审查以及2011年-2013年每年多次的陈述计划的审查,

 

- 考虑到2003年10月13日中国就欧盟历来第一次发表的政策文件,

 

- 考虑到1995年发起的欧盟-中国人权对话,以及最近两次的对话。一次是2011年6月16日在北京举行的 第30次回合以及2012年5月29日在布鲁塞尔举行的第31次回合。

 

- 考虑到中国和欧盟之间尤其有关环境、地区性政策、就业、社会事务以及公民社会的一直在进行的差不多60个行业上的对话,

 

- 考虑到2012年2月建立的欧盟-中国高层人民和人民之间的对话,这也包括在这一领域里所有的欧盟-中国的共同倡议,

 

- 考虑到1998年12月欧盟和中国之间签署的科学和技术合作协定,此协定在2000(2)年生效,并且分别在2004年和2009年得到延续,以及考虑到2009年5月20日签署的科学与技术伙伴关系协定以及2010年12月8日发表的欧盟-中国就能源合作的共同声明,

 

- 考虑到2003年10月30日签署的欧盟伽利略卫星导航计划和中国合作的协定,

 

- 考虑到2012年9月20日在布鲁塞尔举行的第15次欧盟-中国高峰会议以及会议结束时发表的联合新闻公报,

 

- 考虑到2005年9月第8次欧盟-中国高峰会议上同意的欧盟-中国在气候变迁上的伙伴关系以及就气候变迁事宜发表的联合声明,

 

- 考虑到2012年5月3日在布鲁塞尔发表的欧盟-中国针对能源安全的共同声明以及2011年11月欧盟和中国之间举行的第5次能源对话会议。

 

- 考虑到中国-欧盟圆桌会议,

 

- 考虑到2012年11月8-14日召开的中国共产党第18届全国代表大会以及代表大会上决定的政治局常务委员会里领导人的变动,

 

- 考虑到2012年7月11日至12日在布鲁塞尔举行的和中国最近一次议会之间的会议,

 

- 考虑到它最近在中国问题上的决议,特别是2012年5月23日在欧盟和中国问题上的决议:不平衡的贸易?(3),2012年2月2日通过的欧盟对金砖国家和其他新兴国家的政策决议:目标及战略(4),2012年9月12日就欧洲理事会就共同外交和安全政策给欧洲议会的年度报告决议(CFSP)(5),

 

- 考虑到2006年9月7日通过的就欧盟-中国关系(6)以及2009年2月5日通过的针对和中国的贸易和经济关系的决议(7),

-

- 考虑到它在2010年1月21日就中国违反人权,特别是刘晓波案件问题上通过的人权决议,2011年3月10日就喀什(中国新疆维吾尔自治区)的局势和文化遗产的决议(9),2011年4月7日就艾未未的案件通过的决议(10),2012年7月5日就中国强迫堕胎丑闻的决议,2009年11月26日就中国问题的决议:少数民族人士的权利以及死刑的运用(12)2010年12月16日就2009年世界人权年度报告以及欧盟在这一事宜上政策的决议(13),

 

- 考虑到1989年6月天安门镇压事件后欧盟实行的武器禁运,2006年2月2日议会就共同外交及安全政策的主要方面以及基本选择通过的决议支持这一武器禁运,

 

- 考虑到它2005年7月7日就欧盟、中国、台湾之间的关系及远东的安全通过的决议(15),

 

- 考虑到它之前的针对西藏问题和中国人权状况的决议,特别是2010年11月25日就西藏问题的决议:将中文变成教课的主要语言的计划(16),2011年10月27日就西藏问题的决议,特别是尼姑与僧侣自焚的事件(17)以及2012年6月14日就西藏问题的决议:人权局势(18)

 

- 考虑到它的程序规则中的第48条规则,

 

- 考虑到外交事务委员会的报告(A7-0434/2012),

 

A. 鉴于欧盟-中国的战略伙伴关系对欧盟和中国的关系至关重要,鉴于这一关系对寻求全球事务的答案至关重要,如全球及地区性安全、经济危机、全球金融和市场的规章、能源的安全、大量杀伤武器、核非扩散、气候变迁、市场经济的经济和社会发展、促进民主和人权、与组织犯罪斗争、恐怖主义、海盗行径,以及创造一个框架解决欧盟和中国双方关心的问题;

 

B. 鉴于一个战略伙伴关系需要大家强烈地致力于一种互相付责任,互相有一个很好的信任,而且这些必须要建立在普世价值的基础上;

 

C. 鉴于自从1985年签署了欧盟-中国合作协定以来,欧盟-中国的关系发展很快;鉴于欧洲委员会在2006年采纳了它主要的政治战略以及在这一框架下,在2007年1月份发起了就综合性伙伴关系以及合作协定的谈判,目的是为了进一步改善欧盟和中国的关系,特别是在贸易和投资的领域里;

 

D. 鉴于中国正在经历一个社会经济从一个国家控制的经济转向更富有经济自由的过渡阶段,这一个过渡已经使中国一大部分人提高了他们的生活标准;

 

E. 鉴于,然而在政治自由方面中国没有取得类似的进步;

 

F. 鉴于人权是和其他事务互补的,具有普世价值,不可分割的,不可分开的以及和其他事务是互相依靠的;鉴于中国专心致志发展经济和社会人权(如:食物、衣服、经济发展),而欧盟在人权上采取了更广泛的处理方式,包括而且特别强调民权和政治权利(例如:言论自由、宗教自由和结社自由);

 

G. 鉴于中国民权活动家报导说的他们的自由遭到剥夺,因为他们在警察关押下会失踪几个月,没有逮捕证、没有起诉书,不能和家人联络也不能请律师辩护;

 

H. 在2007年胡锦涛对司法系统最高一层的人士指示过说,法官应该由三个“最高”指导,顺序是这样的––党、人民和法律;鉴于中国司法部在2012年3月颁布法令说,所有的律师为了能拿到执照或者延续执照都应该宣誓效忠中国共产党;

 

I. 鉴于2012年6月中旬传来的令人震惊的消息,冯建梅怀的7个月的女儿被残酷强迫堕胎,这一事件引起了废除官方一胎化政策的争论。

 

J. 鉴于,虽然中国政府在促进一些经济和社会权利方面有进步,但在言论自由、结社、集会自由、出版自由行使权利以及参加工会方面的自由还是一直受到压制;鉴于人权组织继续报导中国当局严重违反人权,包括对著名的异议人士判刑,如诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波的监禁,扩大限制媒体和互联网的自由,加强对律师、维权人士以及非政府组织的监控以及骚扰,扩大对维吾尔人、西藏人以及他们自由的控制和压迫,以及越来越多的人被失踪或者遭到任意拘捕,包括将他们投入秘密而不合法的“黑监狱;”鉴于对藏人基本自由压制的政策最近几年引发了他们自焚事件,这些自焚的人数令人不安;

 

K. 鉴于中国是一个《联合国公民权利和政治权利公约》的缔约国并是联合国安理会的永久成员国;鉴于中国处于这样的状态,它有一个特别的责任来遵守《联合国公民权利和政治权利公约》以及《联合国宪章》里规定的国际法律义务;

 

L. 鉴于2008年沙哈洛夫奖的得主胡佳仍处于被软禁状态以及受到广泛的监督,他的通讯也受到限制;

 

M. 鉴于中国国家只承认五个宗教,即,佛教、道教、伊斯兰教和基督教(天主教和新教);鉴于所有这些宗教都有一个总部设在北京的中央制管理机构,这些机构里的官员都是忠于中国共产党的;鉴于中国共产党任命最高宗教领袖并且自1999年以来禁止没有得到批准的宗教社团如法轮功,目的是要根除这一社团;鉴于,因为禁止了这一社团,人权组织报导说他们采取了超出法规的措施,如任意逮捕,强迫劳动以及肉体酷刑,有时后还造成死亡;

 

N. 鉴于西藏自治区,其他西藏自治地区以及新疆维吾尔自治区在中国的战略、地区、军事以及经济上的位置越来越重要,因此中国政府认为它们是中国领土完整的核心问题;鉴于自从2009年以来,至少有90位藏人在中华人民共和国藏人居住的地区自焚,藏人居住的地区包括西藏自治区以及甘肃、四川和青海省的藏人自治地区;

 

O. 鉴于中国经济的开放带来了很多好处如更容易进入就业市场,乡村地区的失业降低,但不是所有的中国人都同样享受到中国经济增长所带来的好处。城乡之间出现了很大的差别;

 

P. 鉴于城乡人口之间在收入上以及进入就业市场、享受社会福利、医疗护理以及教育上的不平等对中国的团结政策构成了一个重大的挑战;

 

Q. 鉴于欧盟-中国在科技领域的合作是我们共同感兴趣的问题;鉴于互联网在中国已经广泛运用,用户达到5亿多,形成了一个公共意见的网上机构;鉴于,然而,互联网的环境还仍然受到很大的限制;

 

R. 鉴于欧盟是世界上观光旅游一大胜地,鉴于到2020年,预计将有一亿中国人会出国旅游,因此有必要支持旨在吸引这些新游客的倡议;

 

S. 鉴于中国是世界上最大的二氧化碳排放者,鉴于其排放量继续在快速上升;鉴于2010年中国每人平均排放6.8吨的二氧化碳,预计在2017年时中国平均每个人的排放量将超过美国;

 

T. 鉴于中国正在以市场排放量对换系统方面加大努力;鉴于中国正在这方面实行七个试验计划,目的在于在2015年建立一个全国排放对换计划;

 

U. 鉴于21世纪中国作为一个经济和商业强国回到世界舞台上,这是因为其迅速增长的经济实力以及不透明的军事增长;

 

V. 鉴于欧盟在中华人民共和国和台湾海峡之间的关系上坚持一个中国的政策;

 

W. 鉴于中华人民共和国在东南亚的经济地区化以及经济态势方面扮演的积极的角色被以下因素蒙上阴影:在南中国海和越南、马来西亚、印度尼西亚、文莱、菲律宾和台湾,在东海和日本和台湾之间的领土争端 – 所有这些地区都富有鱼、石油以及天然气;

 

X. 鉴于中国和北朝鲜有着密切的关系,北朝鲜在经济上大都是依靠中国。中国源源不断地流入北朝鲜的钱和游客对平壤政权目前状态的生存至关重要;

 

Y. 鉴于中国在上海合作组织里(SCO)和俄罗斯,四个中亚国家(哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克)以及四个观察国家(印度、伊朗、蒙古以及巴基斯坦)合作;鉴于2012年6月6日在北京的上海合作组织的高峰会议上说宣布的那样,中国在中亚的投资在今后十年里从200亿美金增长到一千亿美金;

 

Z. 鉴于北京和华盛顿之间的深入发展的关系,以及两国之间牢固的金融和经济关系。这两个关系构成了世界上最重要的两边关系;鉴于欧洲是中国的第一贸易伙伴;

 

AA. 鉴于中国爆发性的成长在非洲和拉丁美洲是最明显不过的了;特别是中国和非洲之间的贸易额,据中国贸易部发表的数字显示,2009年到2011年增长了80%,达到了1663亿美金;鉴于中国在非洲的外币直接投资增长了58.9%,达到了17亿美金;鉴于中国在非洲的利益可以从一些大的开发项目上看到,如铁路,道路以及社会福利项目;

 

欧盟-中国战略伙伴关系及合作

 

1. 支持欧盟和中国在2012年7月9-10日于北京举行的高层战略对话中承诺的义务,这义务即是通过他们建立在共同利益和相互理解基础上的战略伙伴关系来树立一个21世纪国际合作的好榜样;支持及鼓励欧盟和中国之间的将近60个不同行业上的对话,我们相信一个高标准的以及高度发展的伙伴关系将对欧盟和中国都是互利的;

然而,我们希望在人权、环境、安全、能源,特别在打假的领域里还可以增强这些对话,因为它们会影响到公共卫生和安全;鼓励人们在中国的第12个五年计划和欧洲的“2020战略”之间寻求协同效力的合力,目的是为了在各个领域中深入加强实际合作;此外,我们相信战略伙伴关系的概念必须要更好地做出定义;呼吁大家和中国增进贸易和经济关系,这样可以让贸易和经济关系的发展和在人权和法治的政治对话中所取得的重大进步同驱并进。

2. 期待各成员国委任欧洲对外行动服务部(EEAS),特别是它在北京的代表团以一致的口径和中国政府对话,不要履行可能会危害欧洲对外行动服务部努力的双方外交政策倡议,这样以便来加强欧盟-中国战略伙伴关系;呼吁欧盟对中国履行长期的战略,在欧盟各机构之间以及欧盟和它成员国之间提供操作性协调;期待中国各级当局通过一致和透明的运用相互及国际协定和规则来加强欧盟-中国的战略伙伴关系。

 

3. 欢迎在2012年9月20日于布鲁塞尔举行的第15次欧盟-中国高峰会议上达成的协定;敦促迅速执行和履行这些协定,这将会加强欧盟和中国的关系;

 

4. 也欢迎在第15次欧盟-中国高峰会议上所承诺的义务,特别是有关于就投资和建立一个在国防和安全问题上达成一项协定的谈判;

 

5. 考虑到欧盟和中国在经济、贸易、文化和社会层面上的关系可以是这两个社会发展和改善一个重要因素,因此,将这种合作视为双方利益至关重要的因素;

 

6. 欢迎发起成功的第一回合欧盟-中国高层人民对人民之间的对话;对欧盟-中国文化间对话取得的进步和成就表示满意,以及注意到第15届欧盟-中国高峰会议上达成的协议,这协议是有关一系列在教育、文化、多语言环境以及青年领域里采取的后续行动;

 

7. 呼吁欧洲委员会、欧洲理事会以及有关的中国当局在和欧洲议会合作的情况下,通过协调和加快为中国公民发放签证的手续,特别是对参加商务和会议旅行的中国人,来为从中国来的游客提供方便;

 

8. 欢迎在第15次欧盟-中国高峰会议上所呼吁的要发起一个综合性的欧盟-中国之间在适当的水平上就人口流动和移民的对话,以及互相承诺继续探索方便中国和欧盟公民交流的方法,包括对持有外交护照的人士互勉签证。

 

强调中国不但是世界上第二大经济和最大的出口国,也是一个越来越重要的政治强国;

 

内部局势

 

10. 强调中国在最近几十年里取得了重大的社会进步;强调在这么大的国家里,在这么短期内,在生活质量方面提高这么快在历史上也是独特的;注意到中国的经济增长自1990年以来使五亿人民脱离了贫穷;

 

11. 注意到 2012年3月全国人民代表大会批准的第12个五年计划(2011-2015),其目的是在于解决没有节制的高速增长所带来的副作用,如急性环境威胁、地区性不平衡、越来越大的收入不平等以及继续存在的,围绕这社会、经济和法律冤情的集体抗议;

 

12. 注意到在欧洲的“2020战略”和中国的第12个五年计划之间找出共同点的重要性;

 

13. 欢迎中国成功的经济政策,但我们也和独立的中国学者和观察家一样批评中国,即腐败的丑闻、缺乏透明度、由于政治和经济的关系而拥有巨大财富的先前和目前的党领导的亲戚所组成的“红色贵族”都是对成功的经济政策的实施一个很大的威胁。最近薄熙来的案件更加暴露这一严重局势;

 

14. 期待新的党领导人在人们的多次敦促下在中国共产党的内部迅速进行民主和政治改革;相信只有旨在反应中国的族裔,宗教,政治及社会多样化、塑造民主和负责任的机构的、有效率的政治改革才能为可持续的增长和稳定铺平道路,才能抑制采取高压手段的省、地区或当地的党领导人的半独立状态。这些党领导滥用权利,带来了损失很大,所在地区特有的腐败,在内部和外部都损害了中国的国家一级的领导的名誉;考虑到这些案件应该通过引进责任机制来解决,正如胡锦涛主席在2012年11月在第18届党代表大会上所承认的。

 

15. 同情和支持中国律师强烈拒绝向中国共产党宣誓效忠的规定,理由是它对法治系统是一种攻击,这种攻击无视国际法律标准,这是因为任何一位律师都应该对宪法宣誓效忠,而不是对一个政党或一个组织效忠;

 

16. 强调这一点:虽然强迫堕胎在中国严格来说是非法的,但计划生育官员一而再,再而三地强迫妇女做惨无人道的事如强迫堕胎或者结扎手术;我们也谴责所谓的“社会抚养费,”这是一种超生时父母必须付的过度的罚款,如冯建梅的悲剧那样;指出官方统计数字表明在2011年,有8400 名受害者投诉计划生育官员行为不端;

全心全意地支持中国人呼吁结束一胎化的政策,这一政策有很多漏洞,特别是从当今中国的人口趋势看来更是如此。我们这里强调这一政策带来的严重社会和心理上的负面后果,如社会差异,性别之间越来越不平等,生了女孩子大家都不高兴,男孩和女孩人数的不平衡。这一政策制造了“小皇帝,”打乱了传统的家庭结构,此外还有就是减少了劳工市场上的年轻人;呼吁中国领导人把这些问题作为第一优先来考虑,找出一个解决这问题的方法。

 

17. 考虑到富士康工厂里工人的强烈抗议,要求尊重工人的权利;支持工人追求体面的报酬以及体面的工作条件;

 

18. 欢迎中国努力在2015年之前建立一个全国性的废气排放交换系统,将来这系统可以和其他的碳交换系统融合为一体,特别是欧盟的废气排放系统。然而,注意到中国目前还没有一个功能全面的,成熟的市场经济,对于一个充分发挥功能的排放交换系统来说,一个功能全面的,成熟的市场经济明显地是一个前提;

 

19. 敦促中国政府加强对污染物和废气的测量以便来克服缺乏可靠的碳排放数据,建立一个更好的法律基础设施以及在行政的层面上加强容量的建设;在这方面欢迎欧盟和中国之间达成的金融协定,该协定促进环境保护,促进向一个低碳经济的过度以及减少中国温室气体的排放;

 

20. 考虑到香港行政长官在群众示威游行和一片反对声之后决定不强迫实行有争议性的“全国统一教育”的课程;呼吁北京当局充分尊重英国在把香港移交给中国之前签订的协定中的“一国两制”的原则。欢迎最近立法会选举中大批议员调换并期待尽快在选举所有立法委员的事宜上实行普选制;

 

人权和民主

 

21. 赞美并支持一些中国人的勇气和活动。他们以社会上负责的方式来促进和维护普遍受到承认的社会权利和人权,挑战并纠正当地共产党当局犯的社会的危害以及犯罪行为如腐败、滥用职权、破坏环境、艾滋病感染、食物中毒、在学校上的建筑诈骗、非法征收土地和财产;谴责政府官员报复这些中国公民的一切行为;敦促中国领导鼓励人们在观察社会人权上负起公民责任,并为那些遭到官方迫害和惩罚的维权人士平反;提醒中国领导严格遵循国内和国际的人权法;

 

22. 强烈赞成中国律师和法学家声称的对嫌疑犯侮辱性地关押超过15天违反了中国在1998年10月签署的《联合国公民权利和政治权利公约》;对于中国政府不愿意批准《联合国公民权利和政治权利公约》而感到关切。目前这一状态还悬而未决;2013年制定的新刑事诉讼法中规定警察和国家安全当局可以在没有辩护律师协助的情况下拘押嫌疑犯达14个月之久,我们对此深感遗憾;完全支持中国法学家提出的批评,即警察不但能软禁嫌疑犯,还可以“在一个特定的地方逮捕”来拘押;我们支持中国法学家所有的旨在真正改革中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法的倡议;

 

23. 呼吁中国遵守最低的社会标准;强调遵循以及迅速履行国际劳工组织规章的重要性,包括自由建立独立工会的权利;欢迎履行劳工合同法并且呼吁通过一项劳资双方集体谈判的法律来增强立法框架;敦促中国当局,欧洲投资人以及在中国作业的欧洲公司遵守国际劳工标准,保证支付体面的工资和保证有体面的工作条件,并遵守中国的人权;我们持有的观点是欧盟不应该进口童工制造的产品或者是严重违反国际劳工标准和人权,如监狱营里制造出来的产品;

 

24. 我们的观点是欧盟和中国之间的贸易不平衡反映了它们不同的社会、经济以及模式;我们的看法是造成这现象的一个因素就是中国限制或者不存在对某种权利的尊重;强调和中国对话中找出一种战略的重要性,从劳工市场的问题上开始;

 

25. 害怕根据中国死刑立法而执行的犯人的数目以及他们草草审判及之后的草草执行死刑违反了人人享有自由公正审判的人权精神。中国当局进行这些事宜上的速度意味着他们可能会忽略无效审判和其他的错误,造成无辜的人们被枪决;考虑到在一个不透明的司法系统里使用死刑是一个严重的错误。这系统缺乏完全透明性,犯人的权利也没有得到充分发展。呼吁中国当局重新考虑死刑的政策;

 

26. 强调欧盟和中国之间的战略合作伙伴关系包括在互惠基础上的媒体自由。这意味着在欧洲的中国媒体可以享受新闻自由,而在中国的欧洲媒体也能享受媒体自由;期望所有的欧洲机构在和中国伙伴们接触时强烈地提倡这一基本的人权原则;

 

27. 对中国当局控制及检查互联网深感遗憾;中国政府的一则新的法律禁止人们泄露国家秘密,伤害国家尊严,危害民族团结或者号召大家举行“非法抗议活动”或者“大型集会”,通过这些中国政府试图加紧对互联网的监督,我们对此表示关切;因此我们注意到在审查或迫害方面再也没有真正的限度;

这则新的法律规定缺乏保护措施,所以可能会被人滥用,我们对此表示关切;强调“非法抗议活动”或者“大型集会”的短语只有在和平及合法抗议的法律存在并有效的情况下才能用;鼓励中国政府允许人们在因特网上、在媒体上以及在领域中发表不同的观点;最近联合国人权委员会承认人们在互联网上有发表言论的权利;

 

28. 有关对互联网控制的新规定生效,新规定使关闭博客网站合法化,并且对那些维护它们的博客作者、新闻记者以及律师可以重罚。我们对此现象表示关切;

 

29. 强调在一个拥有五亿多互联网用户的国家里,为了有一个繁荣和发达的网络空间,让大家享有电子数码自由是可走的唯一道路;呼吁中国当局保护好他们国家发展起来的巨大网络空间,并努力提升这网络空间,而不是对它采取审查和控制;

 

30. 注意到中国政府在经济上开发西藏和新疆所付出的巨大努力,以及这些努力对游牧社区以及传统生活方式带来的影响;敦促中国政府通过以政治上负责任的方式在管理的问题上和西藏和新疆人民进行有意义地交流,包括资源管理、经济发展的优先权以及尊重而不是冲淡文化因素如语言和宗教;

 

坚决主张中国政府如果通过强迫的强化、摧毁文化或者是通过压制性的警察方法及安全措施是不能在西藏或新疆取得长期稳定的,也不能在汉人、藏人或维吾尔人之间取得团结和友谊,只有认真地解决所有藏人和新疆人提出的问题,为两个自治区的安康让大家真正能共同分担责任才能取得长期的稳定,才能在汉人、藏人或维吾尔人之间取得团结和友谊。

 

31. 强调尽管存在着一个严厉的压制性宗教政策,但中国正发生着一次宗教复兴,这可以从无数的崇拜场所重新开放或者重新建造上看出来;敦促中国当局撤回限制任何公民宗教信仰自由基本权利的政策和做法;

 

32. 呼吁中国当局正式承认新教的家庭教会和地下的天主教会以及其他宗教的非官方教会;在这方面的问题上,无论一个组织有没有登记过,国际人权法均承认宗教自由和信仰自由,这意思就是实践自己的宗教信仰,登记不应该是一个必须实行的先决条件;强烈谴责当局剥夺这些没有登记的教会的基本宗教自由权利,要求它们在政府控制的管理董事会下运作,没收没有登记的教会的财产甚至使用拘押和监禁的方式来使他们沉默从而干涉了教会的宗教自治权以及严重限制了他们的活动;

 

33. 支持中国法学家提出的批评意见,即:中国在宗教问题上的法规最大的缺点是在宪法里。因为宪法第36条中的第1和第2款中的“宗教自由”的原则和第3 和第4款中的“对宗教的限制”的原则相冲突,而且没有澄清哪个有优先权;我们和中国法学家一起呼吁在宪法里建立宗教自由的优先权;

 

34. 承认中国在控制和仔细运用死刑的领域中所做的努力,但中国政府仍然不公布每年执行的死刑人数,而且死刑方面的信息仍然是国家机密,我们对此而感到关切;我们进一步敦促中国当局停止作为政治用途的死刑并保证中国的法律系统里有程序性的保障,这样可以保证被判死刑的人有保护,包括按照国际标准有得到公平审判的权利;

 

35. 我们对欧盟-中国之间的人权对话深感遗憾。此对话一直没有任何实质性的进展,也没有带来任何具体的、可见的结果;回想到通过了新的欧盟人权战略,欧盟的外长们在2012年6月保证现在欧盟会“在所有合适的双边对话中,包括最高层的对话中,强有力的提出人权问题;”

呼吁新任命的欧盟特别人权代表、欧洲对外行动服务部 (EEAS)、 欧洲理事会和欧洲委员会加强努力来给这过程一个新的动力并使这一对话更加有效率,更加能出成果,包括通过双方的当局都在场情况下和国际及当地公民社会组织以及非政府组织举行的预备会议;我们的观点是这样的对话应该包括在和所有战略伙伴(如中国)的所有接触当中;强调彻底解决所有和人权、中国的法治和欧盟的法治有关的所有问题的重要性;

我们的看法是欧盟-中国的高峰会议以及人权会谈应该包括一套供来讨论的有透明性的问题以及具体的基准点;敦促欧盟的外交事务及安全政策的高级代表凯萨琳ž阿西顿对中国违反人权的现象表示关切并在和中国官员所有的接触当中公开地讨论具体案件和问题;鼓励成员国的官员以连贯、协调的方式走同样的路线;呼吁在中国有生意的欧盟公司遵守联合国商业及人权指南并敦促欧盟以及其成员国密切监视它们是否遵循了这一些规定;

 

海峡两岸的关系

 

36. 强调欧盟的一个中国的政策;欢迎中华人民共和国和台湾之间的越来越多的接触;强调海峡两岸关系的改善,中国的导弹对准台湾以及中国在国际上孤立台湾,这使两岸关系受到严重破坏;正如2009年5月8日通过的9486/2009欧洲理事会声明里所赞同的,支持台湾在国际组织里有意义的参与;

 

37. 很高兴地看到成百万的中国公民对2012年1月14日台湾举行的总统及议会选举表现极大的兴趣,这是第一次能在网上实时跟踪的选举;

 

38. 向强大的和繁荣的海峡两岸关系表示致敬,同时也向台湾开放中国的游客以及文化合作致敬;考虑到贸易和投资的国际化是台湾稳定最好的保证;因此敦促台湾政府在中华人民共和国投资的同时也在世界其他地方投资;

 

外部局势

 

39. 敦促中华人民共和国以更负责的方式使用其全球的地位,特别是在它拥有一个永久席位和否定权的联合国安理会上;在此问题上,我们强调为了能让大家干预叙利亚来停止内战,作为民主和自由过程的一部分让叙利亚人民把他们国家的未来掌握在自己手中,中国需要放弃其在安理会决议的否定权。强调中国也应该通过遵循世界贸易组织的规章,通过遵守所有它签署的国际公约和条约来以它全球贡献相称的、负责任的方式在G20 20国集团的层面上来对付全球金融危机;

 

40. 敦促中华人民共和国在国外追求它的目标的时候要明确地遵守联合国宪章以及国际法;

 

41. 大部分因为其迅速发展的现代化海军,中国在联合国安理会永久成员国里是维持和平部队最大的贡献者,对此我们表示感激;在这一方面,欢迎和欧盟在亚丁湾打击海盗行为事宜上有着越来越多的合作。呼吁中国作为一个联合国安理会的一永久成员国在重要的全球安全问题上,如叙利亚和伊朗的局势上和国际社会以负责任的方式合作;

 

42. 承认中国向其公民提供安全以及在世界上扮演一个促进和平和稳定的角色的责任,并欢迎它在联合国有越来越大的参与;然而,我们呼吁中国方面在这些事宜上能显示更多的透明度以及在这些事宜上和欧盟及联合国能够有更紧密的合作,这样在它的外交政策上避免孤立;

 

43. 呼吁中国审视在发生严重违反国际人权法的时候它的“不干涉其他国家内部事务”的政策;

 

44. 欢迎2012年7月欧盟-中国就共同安全及防御政策上的对话;建议这一对话延伸到包括整个亚太地区;

 

45. 请求中国消除国际社会对其非透明的军事预算问题上的关切;

 

46. 强调南中国海在世界上重要性。世界贸易总量的三分之一是从这里通过的;我们对在此地区越来越大的紧张局势感到惊恐,因此我们在这里紧急地呼吁这一地区所有各方不要采取单方面的政治或军事行动,缓和他们的激励言辞,按照国际法,特别是联合国海洋法律公约,通过国际仲裁来解决他们在南中国海的领土争端,这样来保证这地区的稳定;

 

47. 我们对中国和日本之间紧张局势升级感到担忧;我们向中国和日本呼吁去除他们之间互相是敌人的观念,同时对于他们没有利用建立外交关系40周年之际进行一些建设性的谈判感到遗憾;

 

48. 鉴于东亚的安全和稳定是欧盟重大利益所在,我们呼吁有关各方(中国、日本和台湾)克制自己,采取步骤来缓和有争议的岛屿上的局势;敦促有关各方在合作精神的指导下以和平的方式按照国际法,特别是联合国海洋法公约来解决争端,并同意在发生没有预见的事件时各方采取缓和的措施;

 

49. 注意到台湾的倡议,目的是在中国东海的行为准则上达成一致的意见,并建立一种机制让所有各方合作来一起开发这地区的自然资源,包括从可以更新的资源那里发电的能力;

 

50. 注意到朝鲜半岛的双方之间的合作上中国所扮演的角色至关重要,我们呼吁中华人民共和国更积极地寻求朝鲜和韩国之间更高一级的合作;

 

51. 我们注意到北朝鲜专制独裁政权主要靠中国才能生存,我们对此感到遗憾;欢迎中国做出负责任的行为投票赞成联合国安理会强烈谴责北朝鲜于2012年4月15日失败发射的火箭。大家一般都认为这是一次弹道导弹试验;期望中国能继续为了朝鲜半岛上的稳定而负起的责任,就朝鲜核威胁迅速重新召开六方会谈,尤其是,通过中国的鼓励迅速提高北朝鲜公民的日常生活状况;

 

52. 注意到中国通过贸易、经济及能源的工程在中亚地区扮演的越来越大的角色;考虑到中国能在中亚国家的发展上扮演一个重要的角色,呼吁中华人民共和国促进那些国家之间更好的关系,这是促进此地区合作的一个重要的步骤;注意到中国在上海合作组织里的主要目标就是通过共同打击所谓的“三股邪恶势力”,即国际恐怖主义、宗教极端主义和民族分裂势力来取得中亚的和平和稳定;注意到中国在开发中亚地区巨大的石油和天然气储备而对这地区的战略和经济利益以及中亚通过铁路和公路到中国海岸的连接线;

 

53. 欢迎中国和阿富汗之间正在发展的关系,他们之间举行了历史第一次高层会谈;考虑到中国可以通过软势力在稳定阿富汗的问题上扮演一个关键的角色。我们敦促欧盟和中国之间在这个问题上发展密切的合作;

 

54. 观察到中国领导人认为美国重新注重亚洲重要性的战略是美国想抑制中国快速增长的经济和政治上的上升;鼓励中国和美国避免紧张局势也避免在太平洋的军事竞赛;敦促中国保证在海上自由航行;

 

55. 认为应该严肃考虑中国在发展中国家越来越多的投资对那里的经济、社会和环境的影响;

 

56. 注意到越来越多的中国人在非洲为那里的经济发展作出了贡献,特别是基础设施;我们很欣赏中国领导人在2012年7月20日于北京举行的中非合作论坛上承认人们严厉批评它在非洲不平衡的、以原料为中心的政策,而现在它在非洲大陆上公开促进多样化;

 

欢迎党和国家领导人胡锦涛在中非合作论坛的会议上保证在今后三年里向非洲国家提供破记录的200亿美金的贷款用来发展他们的基础设施、农业、制造业以及中小型企业;欢迎中国所表示的要支持提炼行业透明度倡议(EITI)并鼓励中国当局跟从全球的趋势,做到更加透明并在此地区增加他们的承诺;呼吁欧盟对中国在非洲越来越大的投资所带来的政治、经济、社会和环境影响保持警惕;

 

57. 对中国在非洲越来越多的活动所带来的严重社会紧张局势我们表示关切,但欢迎中国公司所表示的他们愿意在他们在非洲的活动中更加强调公司的社会责任;敦促中国当局在尊重人权、促进可持续发展以及人的安全的原则上实行他们在非洲的政策;

 

58. 注意到中国越来越多地介入到开采拉丁美洲自然资源的事宜上。中国对这些资源的进口增加了50%。

 

59. 鼓励中国这个世界上最大的二氧化碳排放者在全球社区里促进合作时扮演一个更加有前瞻性、更加具有建设性的角色来处理全球变暖的问题;欢迎中国当局在2011年11月发表的白皮书,这白皮书叙述了为全球变暖所制定的政策以及采取的行动。我们呼吁它迅速履行这些政策;

 

60. 注意到人民与人民之间的交往可以在中国和欧盟之间以及中国和它其他的合作者之间(如和美国之间)达成更好的互相了解扮演一个关键的角色;在这方面我们欢迎旨在促进中国和欧盟之间互动的项目计划;

 

61. 敦促中国通过维护平等、互利以及公司社会责任的原则来保证外国公司在法律上的确定性绝对是他们优先考虑的问题;

 

62. 命令其主席将此决议交给欧洲理事会、欧洲对外行动服务部、欧洲委员会、成员国、马上要加入欧盟的国家以及候选国家的政府和议会、中华人民共和国政府、中国全国人民代表大会、台湾政府以及台湾的立法院。

英文原版:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0097+0+DOC+XML+V0//en&language=en


The European Parliament ,
–  having regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EU and China in May 1975,
–  having regard to the main legal framework for relations with China, namely the EC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement(1) , signed in May 1985, which covers economic and trade relations and the EU-China cooperation programme,
–  having regard to the negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that have been ongoing since 2007,
–  having regard to the EU-China Strategic Partnership launched in 2003,
–  having regard to the structured EU-China political dialogue formally established in 1994 and the High-Level Strategic Dialogue on strategic and foreign policy issues established in 2010,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 October 2006 to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘EU – China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities’ (COM(2006)0631),
–  having regard to the Commission policy paper entitled ‘A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations’ (COM(2003)0533), endorsed by the European Council on 13 October 2003,
–   having regard to the Council's East Asia Policy Guidelines,
–  having regard to the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions of 11-12 December 2006 entitled ‘EU-China Strategic Partnership’,
–  having regard to the Commission Strategy Paper for China 2007-2013, the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013, and the 2010 mid-term review of the Strategy Paper and review of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2011-2013,
–  having regard to the first ever policy paper by China on the EU, issued on 13 October 2003,
–  having regard to the EU-China dialogue on human rights, launched in 1995, and to the latest two rounds of the dialogue, the 30th round held in Beijing on 16 June 2011 and the 31st round held in Brussels on 29 May 2012,
–  having regard to the almost 60 sectoral dialogues ongoing between China and the Union concerning, inter alia , the environment, regional policy, employment and social affairs, and civil society,
–  having regard to the establishment in February 2012 of the EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue, which will accommodate all EU-China joint initiatives in this field,
–  having regard to the scientific and technological cooperation agreement between the EC and China signed in December 1998, which entered into force in 2000(2) and was renewed in 2004 and 2009, the Science and Technology Partnership Agreement signed on 20 May 2009 and the EC-China Joint statement on energy cooperation of 8 December 2010,
–  having regard to the agreement with China on cooperation in the EU's Galileo satellite navigation programme, signed on 30 October 2003,
–  having regard to the 15th EU-China Summit, which took place in Brussels on 20 September 2012, and to the Joint Press Communiqué issued at the conclusion thereof,
–  having regard to the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change agreed, and the Joint Declaration on Climate Change issued, at the 8th EU-China Summit in September 2005,
–  having regard to the EU-China Joint Declaration on Energy Security made in Brussels on 3 May 2012, and to the 5th meeting of the Energy Dialogue between the EC and China held in November 2011,
–  having regard to the China-EU Round Tables,
–  having regard to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which took place from 8-14 November 2012, and to the leadership changes in the Politburo Standing Committee as decided at the congress,
–  having regard to its most recent Interparliamentary Meeting with China, which took place in Brussels on 11 and 12 July 2012,
–   having regard to its recent resolutions on China, in particular those of 23 May 2012 on EU and China: Unbalanced Trade?(3) , of 2 February 2012 on the EU foreign policy towards the BRICs and other emerging powers: objectives and strategies(4) , and of 12 September 2012 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)(5) ,
–  having regard to its resolutions of 7 September 2006 on EU-China relations(6) and of 5 February 2009 on trade and economic relations with China(7) ,
–  having regard to its human rights resolutions of 21 January 2010 on human rights violations in China, notably the case of Liu Xiaobo(8) , of 10 March 2011 on the situation and cultural heritage in Kashgar (Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China)(9) , of 7 April 2011 on the case of Ai Weiwei(10) , of 5 July 2012 on the forced abortion scandal in China(11) , of 26 November 2009 on China: minority rights and application of the death penalty(12) , of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2009 and the European Union's policy on the matter(13) ,
–  having regard to the EU arms embargo introduced after the Tiananmen crackdown of June 1989, as supported by Parliament in its resolution of 2 February 2006 on the main aspects and basic choices of Common Foreign and Security Policy(14) ,
–  having regard to its resolution of 7 July 2005 on relations between the EU, China and Taiwan and security in the Far East(15) ,
–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Tibet and the human rights situation in China, in particular its resolutions of 25 November 2010 on Tibet: plans to make Chinese the main language of instruction(16) , of 27 October 2011 on Tibet, in particular self-immolation by nuns and monks(17) and of 14 June 2012 on Tibet: the human rights situation(18) ,
–  having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A7-0434/2012),
A.  whereas the EU-China strategic partnership is of great importance for relations between the EU and China, and whereas this relationship is paramount for finding answers to global concerns, such as global and regional security, the economic crisis, global financial and market regulation, energy security, weapons of mass destruction and nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, the economic and social development of a market economy, the promotion of democracy and human rights and the fight against organised crime, terrorism and piracy, as well as in creating a framework to address bilateral concerns between the EU and China;
B.  whereas a strategic partnership requires a strong commitment to mutual responsibility and a good level of confidence, and must be based on universal values;
C.  whereas EU-China relations have developed considerably since the signing of the EU-China cooperation agreement in 1985; whereas the Commission adopted its main political strategy on China in 2006 and, in this context, launched negotiations in January 2007 on a comprehensive partnership and cooperation agreement with a view to further improving relations between the EU and China, in particular in the field of trade and investment;
D.  whereas China is undergoing a process of socio-economic transition from an extensive model based on a state-controlled economy to a model based on more economic freedoms, which in turn has allowed a large proportion of the Chinese population to raise its standard of living;
E.  whereas, however, similar progress has not been made in the field of political liberties;
F.  whereas human rights are complementary, universal, inalienable, indivisible and interdependent; whereas China shows its preoccupation with economic and social human rights (e.g. food, clothing, economic development) while the EU takes a broader approach to human rights, including and with a particular emphasis on civil and political rights (e.g. freedom of speech, religion and association);
G.  whereas Chinese civil rights activists have reported on the deprivation of their liberty when they disappeared in police custody for several months, without any arrest warrant, indictment, contact with their families or legal aid;
H.  whereas already in 2007 President Hu Jintao instructed the highest level of the judiciary that judges should be guided by three ‘supremacies'– the party, the people and the law, in that order – and whereas the Chinese Ministry of Justice decreed in March 2012 that all lawyers should swear an oath of allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to obtain or renew their licence;
I.  whereas the shocking news of mid-June 2012 regarding the extremely cruel forced abortion of the unborn daughter of seven-month-pregnant Feng Jianmei fuelled the debate on the abolition of the official one-child policy;
J.  whereas, despite the Chinese Government's progress in promoting some economic and social rights, the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, press freedom and the right to join a trade union is persistently repressed; whereas human rights organisations continue to report serious human rights abuses by the Chinese authorities, including the sentencing of high-profile dissidents such as imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, expanded restrictions on media and internet freedom, tightened surveillance and harassment of lawyers, human rights defenders and non-governmental organisations, broadened control and oppression of Uighurs, Tibetans and their freedoms, and increasing numbers of enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions, including in secret, unlawful detention facilities known as ‘black jails’; whereas repressive policies against Tibetans' basic freedoms have triggered a worrying number of self-immolations in recent years;
K.  whereas China is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; whereas this status entails a special duty for China to abide by its international legal obligations under the ICCPR and the Charter of the United Nations;
L.  whereas Hu Jia, the 2008 Sakharov Prize laureate, remains under house arrest and is subject to extensive surveillance and restricted communication;
M.   whereas the Chinese state recognises only five religions, namely Buddhism, Daoism, Islam and Christianity (both Catholicism and Protestantism); whereas all of these religions have centralised governing bodies with headquarters in Beijing and are staffed by officials loyal to the CCP; whereas the CCP appoints top religious leaders and has banned non-approved religious groups such as Falun Gong since 1999 with the aim of eradicating the practice; whereas, as a consequence of this ban, human rights organisations have reported extralegal coercive measures such as arbitrary arrests, forced labour and physical torture, sometimes resulting in death;
N.  whereas the Tibet Autonomous Region, other Tibetan autonomous areas and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have become increasingly important as regards China's strategic, regional, military and economic considerations and are therefore seen by the Chinese Government as core issues for China's territorial integrity; whereas since 2009 at least 90 Tibetans have self-immolated in Tibetan-populated areas of the People's Republic of China (PRC), including the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous areas within the Gansu, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces;
O.  whereas, although the opening-up of the Chinese economy has brought major benefits such as better access to the employment market and a fall in rural unemployment, not all segments of the Chinese population have benefited equally from China's economic growth and there are large disparities emerging between urban and rural parts of the country;
P.  whereas inequalities between urban and rural populations in terms of income and access to employment, social welfare, healthcare and education constitute a significant cohesion policy challenge for China;
Q.  whereas EU-China cooperation in the field of science and technology is a matter of common interest; whereas internet use has spread in China and there are now more than 500 million users forming an online body of public opinion; whereas, however, the country's internet environment remains very restrictive;
R.  whereas the EU is the world's leading tourist destination, whereas 100 million Chinese are expected to travel abroad by 2020 and whereas it is therefore necessary to support initiatives aimed at attracting these new tourist flows;
S.  whereas China is the world's biggest carbon dioxide emitter and whereas emission levels are still increasing rapidly; whereas China's per capita CO2 emissions reached 6.8 tonnes in 2010 and are expected to overtake US per capita emissions by 2017;
T.  whereas China is stepping up its efforts as regards market-based emissions trading systems; whereas China is carrying out seven pilot projects in this area with the purpose of establishing a national emissions trading scheme in 2015;
U.  whereas the 21st century is seeing China return to the world scene as an economic and commercial power, on account of its rapidly growing economic power and opaque military build-up;
V.  whereas the EU adheres to its one-China policy in the context of cross-Strait relations between the PRC and Taiwan;
W.  whereas the positive role played by the PRC in South-East Asia in terms of economic regionalisation and dynamics is becoming increasingly overshadowed by territorial disputes in the South China Sea with Vietnam. Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan, and in the East China Sea with Japan and Taiwan – all areas rich in fish and in oil and gas reserves;
X.  whereas China maintains close relations with North Korea, the latter being largely economically dependent on the former, with an inflow of Chinese money and tourists being vital to the survival of the Pyongyang regime in its current state;
Y whereas China is cooperating with Russia, four Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and four observer countries (India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan) in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); whereas Chinese investments in Central Asia will rise in the next decade from USD 20 billion to USD 100 billion, as announced at the SCO Summit in Beijing on 6 June 2012;
Z.  whereas the deepening relations between Beijing and Washington, along with the strong financial and economic ties between the two countries, constitute one of the world's most significant bilateral relationships; whereas Europe is China's first trading partner;
AA.  whereas nowhere in the world is China's explosive growth more visible than in Africa and Latin America; whereas this is illustrated in particular by the impressive rise in China's mutual trade volume in Africa, which increased by 80 % between 2009 and 2011 to USD 166,3 billion, according to statistics released by the Chinese Trade Ministry; whereas Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose by 58,9 % in 2011 to USD 1,7 billion; whereas Chinese interests in Africa are visible through major development projects such as railways, roads and social welfare projects;
EU-China Strategic Partnership and cooperation
1.  Supports the public commitment made by the EU and China during their High-Level Strategic Dialogue of 9-10 July 2012 in Beijing to setting a good example of international cooperation in the 21st century through their Strategic Partnership based on shared interests and mutual understanding; supports and encourages the almost 60 sectoral dialogues between the EU and China, with the conviction that an enhanced and highly developed partnership will be mutually beneficial to both the EU and China; wishes, however, to see a strengthening of these dialogues in the fields of human rights, the environment, security, energy and in particular the fight against counterfeit products, in view of its impact on public health and safety; encourages efforts to actively seek synergies between China's 12th Five-Year Plan and the Europe 2020 strategy with a view to deepening pragmatic cooperation in various fields; believes, moreover, that the concept of strategic partnership must be better defined; calls for increased trade and economic relations with China to go hand in hand with considerable progress in the political dialogue on human rights and the rule of law;
2.  Expects Member States to give the European External Action Service (EEAS) and especially its Delegation in Beijing a clear mandate to strengthen the EU-China Strategic Partnership by speaking with one voice to the Chinese Government, and to refrain from implementing bilateral foreign policy initiatives that may jeopardise the efforts being made by the EEAS; calls for the EU to implement a long-term strategy vis-à-vis China, providing operational coordination both between the institutions of the Union and between the Union and its Member States; expects the Chinese authorities, at all political levels, to strengthen the EU-China Strategic Partnership through the consistent and transparent application of mutual and international agreements and rules;
3.  Welcomes the agreements reached during the 15th EU-China Summit held in Brussels on 20 September 2012; urges their swift operationalisation and implementation, which will strengthen relations between the Union and China;
4.  Welcomes also the commitments made at the 15th EU-China Summit, in particular regarding the negotiation of an agreement on investment and the establishment of a regular dialogue on defence and security issues;
5.  Considers that relations between the EU and China, both at the economic and trade levels and at the cultural and social levels, could be one of the major factors in the development and betterment of both societies and therefore sees this cooperation as vital for the interests of both sides;
6.  Welcomes the launch and successful first round of the EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue; expresses satisfaction with the progress and achievements of the EU-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue and takes note of the agreement reached at the 15th EU-China Summit on a series of follow-up actions in various areas relating to education, culture, multilingualism and youth;
7.  Calls on the Commission, the Council and the relevant Chinese authorities to facilitate, in cooperation with Parliament, tourist flows from China to the EU by harmonising and accelerating procedures for issuing visas for Chinese nationals, particularly in the context of business and conference travel;
8.  Welcomes the call made by both sides at the 15th EU-China Summit for the launch of a comprehensive EU-China dialogue on mobility and migration at an appropriate level and their mutual undertaking to continue to explore ways of facilitating exchanges for Chinese ad EU citizens, including mutual visa exemptions for holders of diplomatic passports;
9.  Emphasises that China is not only the world's second-largest economy and biggest exporter in the global economy, but also an increasingly important political power;

Internal situation
10.  Stresses that China, in recent decades, has achieved significant social progress; emphasises that such an improvement in the quality of life in a huge country in such a short period of time is unique in history; notes that China's economic growth has lifted more than half a billion people out of poverty since 1990;
11.  Takes note of the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), approved by the National People's Congress in March 2012, which is intended to tackle the negative side-effects of an unparalleled period of sustained high economic growth, such as acute environmental threats, regional imbalances, rising income inequality and continuing collective protests centred on social, economic and legal grievances;
12.  Notes the importance of identifying common ground between the Europe 2020 strategy and China's 12th Five-Year-Plan;
13.  Welcomes China's successful economic policy, but shares the criticism made by independent Chinese scholars and observers that the preservation of this trend is seriously threatened by corruption scandals, a lack of transparency and a ‘red aristocracy’ of close family members of former and present party leaders who possess enormous fortunes owing to their political and economic connections, a grave situation which was recently laid bare by the Bo Xilai affair;
14.  Looks forward to the speedy implementation of the repeated calls for democratisation and political reforms inside the CCP by the new party leadership; believes that only effective political reforms aimed at shaping inclusive, democratic and accountable institutions that reflect China's ethnic, religious, political and social diversity will pave the way for building sustainable growth and stability and curb the semi-independence of high-handed provincial, district and local party bosses, who badly damage the reputation of China's national leadership both internally and externally through their abuses of power, with particular reference to the very costly and endemic cases of corruption; considers that such cases should be tackled through the introduction of accountability mechanisms, as acknowledged by Chairman Hu Jintao during the 18th CCP Congress of November 2012;
15.  Shares and supports the vehement rejection by Chinese lawyers of a compulsory oath of allegiance to the CCP on the grounds that it is an attack on the legal system which blatantly disregards international legal standards, because any lawyer should swear allegiance to the constitution and not to a political party or organisation;
16.  Emphasises that, although forced abortions are strictly illegal in China, family-planning officials repeatedly coerce women into inhumane practices such as forced abortions or sterilisation; condemns the so-called ‘social maintenance fee’, an often-exorbitant fine that parents have to pay in the event of extra births, as was the case in the tragedy of Feng Jianmei; points out that official statistics show that in 2011 there were 8 400 complaints from victims about misconduct by family-planning authorities; wholeheartedly supports Chinese voices calling for an end to the one-child policy, with its many loopholes, particularly in the light of demographic trends in China, while stressing its severe negative social and psychological consequences such as social disparities, a worsening gender equality situation, widespread negative feeling about the birth of a female child and the still-growing imbalance between baby boys and girls, which is creating ‘little emperors’, disrupting the traditional family structure and, moreover, reducing the intake of young people in the labour market; calls on the Chinese leadership to consider it a top priority to find a solution to this problem;
17.  Takes serious account of the vigorous protests by workers at the Foxconn plant and demands that workers' rights be respected; supports the pursuit of decent pay and decent working conditions;
18.  Welcomes China's efforts to establish a nationwide emissions trading system by 2015, which could in the future be integrated with other carbon trading systems, in particular the EU's Emissions Trading System; notes, however, that China does not yet have a fully-functioning, mature market economy, which is a clear prerequisite for a well-functioning emissions trading system;
19.  Urges the Chinese Government to step up the measuring of pollutants and emissions in order to overcome the lack of reliable carbon emission data, to establish a better legal infrastructure and to increase capacity-building at an administrative level; welcomes, in this connection, the financing agreement of 20 September 2012 between the EU and China, which promotes the environment, the transition towards a low-carbon economy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in China;
20.  Takes note of the decision of Hong Kong's Chief Executive not to force the implementation of a controversial ‘national education’ curriculum following mass demonstrations and widespread opposition; calls on the Beijing authorities fully to respect the ‘one country-two systems’ principle in compliance with the agreement signed before the handover of the former British colony to the PRC; welcomes the high turnout in the recent Legislative Council elections and expects universal suffrage to be introduced for the election of all the members of this assembly as soon as possible;
Human rights and democracy
21.  Admires and supports the courage and activism of those Chinese citizens acting in socially responsible ways to promote and defend universally recognised social and human rights, and to challenge and correct well-known social dangers and/or criminal acts such as corruption, abuses of office, environmental damage, AIDS infection, food poisoning, construction fraud in relation to schools, and illegal land and property expropriation, often committed by local party authorities; denounces all instances of official retaliation against these Chinese citizens; urges the Chinese leadership to encourage civil responsibility in terms of observing social human rights and to rehabilitate officially persecuted and punished defenders of these rights; reminds the Chinese leadership to comply strictly with domestic and international human rights law;
22.  Strongly endorses the critical comments of Chinese lawyers and jurists that the humiliating detainment of suspects for more than 15 days conflicts with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed in October 1998; expresses its concern at the unwillingness of the Chinese Government to ratify the ICCPR, a situation which is still pending; deplores the fact that under the new Criminal Procedures Law of 2013 police and state security authorities can even detain a suspect for more than 14 months without any assistance from a lawyer; fully supports the criticism of Chinese jurists that the police retain the option not only of keeping suspects under house arrest, but also of detaining them under the rules on ‘arrest at a determined place’; backs all initiatives by Chinese jurists with a view to real reform of the PRC's Criminal Procedures Law;
23.  Calls on China to comply with minimum social standards; underlines the importance of compliance with, and rapid implementation of, all International Labour Organisation rules, including the right freely to form independent trade unions; welcomes the implementation of the labour contract law and calls for the legislative framework to be supplemented by the adoption of a law on collective bargaining; urges both the Chinese authorities and European investors and companies operating in China to observe international labour standards and to guarantee decent pay and working conditions and respect for human rights in China; takes the view that the EU should not allow market access for goods which have been produced by means of child labour or in facilities which gravely violate international labour standards and human rights, such as prison camps;
24.  Takes the view that the trade imbalances between the EU and China reflect their differing social, economic and democratic models; takes the view that the limited or non-existent degree of respect for certain rights in China is a contributing factor; stresses the importance of identifying a strategy for dialogue with China, starting with labour market issues;
25.  Fears that the number of prisoners being executed under China's death penalty legislation, as well as the expediency of their trials and subsequent executions, goes against the spirit of the human right to a free and fair trial, in that the speed used by Chinese authorities means that mistrials and other errors could be overlooked, leading to the execution of innocent people; considers that the application of the death penalty within an opaque judicial system, which lacks full transparency and in which the rights of the prisoner are as yet still not fully developed, is a grave error; calls on the Chinese authorities to reconsider their policy on capital punishment;
26.  Stresses that the Strategic Partnership between the EU and China includes freedom of the media on a reciprocal basis, which implies press freedom for the Chinese media in Europe and also press freedom for European media in China; expects all the European institutions strongly to advocate this fundamental human rights principle in their contacts with their respective Chinese partners;
27.  Deplores the control and censorship of the internet by the Chinese authorities; notes with concern that the Chinese Government is tightening its surveillance of the internet by means of a new law that forbids people from betraying state secrets, harming national pride, endangering the country's ethnic unity or making calls for ‘illegal protests’ or ‘mass meetings’; notes that there is therefore no longer any real limit on censorship or persecution; is concerned by the lack of safeguards provided under the new law, making it possible to use it in an abusive way; emphasises that the terms ‘illegal protests’ and ‘mass meetings’ should only be used in situations where a law on peaceful and legal protests exists and is effective; encourages the Chinese Government to allow the expression of a plurality of opinions on the internet, in the media and, more generally, in the public sphere; recalls that the right to freedom of expression on the internet has recently been recognised by the UN Human Rights Council;
28.  Is concerned about the entry into force of the new provisions relating to control of the internet, which legalise the closure of blogs and lay down stiff penalties for bloggers, journalists, and lawyers who defend them;
29.  Stresses that in a country with more than 500 million internet users, digital freedoms are the only way to achieve a flourishing and developed cyberspace; calls on the Chinese authorities both to secure and to protect the huge cybersphere developed in their country and to target their efforts towards its enhancement and not towards censorship and control;
30.  Takes note of the significant efforts made by the Chinese Government to develop Tibet and Xinjiang economically, and of the impact of those efforts on nomad communities and traditional livelihoods; urges the Chinese Government to act in a politically responsible way by meaningfully engaging the Tibetan and Uighur peoples in governance issues, including resource management and economic development priorities, and respecting rather than diluting cultural elements such as language and religion; strongly asserts that the Chinese Government will not achieve lasting stability in Tibet or Xinjiang or comity among the Chinese, Tibetan and Uighur peoples through forcible assimilation, cultural destruction or repressive police and security methods, but only by seriously addressing all indigenous complaints in order to create genuinely shared responsibility for the well-being of both autonomous provinces; urges the Chinese Government to put an end to the ban on independent observers visiting these regions;
31.  Stresses that, notwithstanding a harsh policy of repression, a religious revival is taking place in China which is demonstrated by the reopening or reconstruction of countless places of worship; urges the Chinese authorities to pull back on policies and practices that curtail any citizen's fundamental right to freedom of religion and belief;
32.  Calls on the Chinese authorities to grant Protestant house churches and underground Catholic churches, as well as those of other religions, official recognition; recalls, in this connection, that international human rights law recognises freedom of religion or belief regardless of registration status, meaning that registration should not be a mandatory precondition for practising one's religion; strongly condemns all attempts by the authorities to deprive these non-registered churches of their fundamental right to freedom of religion by imposing the requirement to operate under government-controlled management boards, confiscating their property and even using detention and imprisonment in an effort to silence them, thereby interfering with their religious autonomy and seriously restricting their activity;
33.  Shares the criticism of Chinese jurists that the fundamental shortcomings of China's legal code on religion reside in the constitution, since the principle of ‘religious freedom’ provided for in clauses 1 and 2 of Article 36 conflicts with the principle of ‘restrictions on religion’ provided for in clauses 3 and 4, with no clarification as to which takes precedence; joins the call by Chinese jurists religious freedom to be established as the principle of precedence in the constitution;
34.  Acknowledges efforts made in the area of controlling and carefully applying the death penalty in China, but remains concerned at the fact that the Chinese Government is still maintaining its policy of not releasing details of the number of prisoners executed annually, keeping information on the death penalty a state secret; further urges the Chinese authorities to stop the politicised use of the death penalty and to ensure that there are procedural safeguards in the country's legal system which guarantee the protection of people sentenced to death, including the right to a fair trial in accordance with international standards;
35.  Considers regrettable, as regards the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue, the continuing lack of any substantial progress and the failure to produce concrete and visible results; recalls that, on the adoption of a new EU human rights strategy, EU foreign ministers pledged in June 2012 that the EU would now ‘raise human rights issues vigorously in all appropriate forms of bilateral dialogue, including at the highest level’; calls on the newly appointed EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the EEAS, the Council and the Commission to step up their efforts in order to give this process new impetus and make this dialogue more effective and result-oriented, including through preparatory meetings with both international and local civil society organisations and NGOs in the presence of the authorities of both sides; takes the view that such dialogue should be included in all contacts with officials from strategic partners such as China; stresses the importance of addressing thoroughly all the problems relating to human rights and the rule of law in China and in the EU; takes the view that EU-China summits and human rights talks should include a set of transparent issues to be discussed and concrete benchmarks; urges the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, to voice her concerns regarding human rights abuses in China and to refer publicly to the concrete cases and issues discussed with Chinese officials in all encounters; encourages Member States' officials to follow the same lines in a coherent and coordinated manner; calls on EU companies with activities in China to comply with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and urges the EU and its Member States to monitor such compliance closely;
Cross-Strait relations
36.  Reiterates the EU´s one-China policy; welcomes the increasing contacts between the PRC and Taiwan; stresses the improvement in cross-Strait relations, although they are still being seriously undermined by Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan and by China's international isolation of Taiwan; supports Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organisations, as endorsed by Council Declaration 9486/2009 of 8 May 2009;
37.  Is pleased at the great interest taken by millions of Chinese citizens in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Taiwan on 14 January 2012, which could be followed instantly on the internet for the first time;
38.  Salutes the strong and flourishing cross-Strait economic ties, as well as the new opening-up of Taiwan to Chinese tourists and cultural cooperation; considers the internationalisation of trade and investment to be the best guarantor of Taiwan's stability; urges Taiwan's government, therefore, to accompany its investment in the PRC with investments elsewhere;
External situation
39.  Urges the PRC to use its global position in a more responsible way, in particular in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), where it holds a permanent seat and a right of veto; stresses, in this connection, the need for China to abandon its veto position on any UNSC resolution allowing intervention in Syria in order to halt the civil war and to enable the Syrian people to take the future of their country into their hands, as part of a democratic and free process; stresses that China should also act in a responsible manner that is commensurate with its global contribution, at G20 level to deal with the world financial crisis, by aligning itself with World Trade Organisation rules, and by observing all international conventions and treaties to which it is a party;
40.  Urges the PRC unequivocally to commit itself to observing the UN Charter and international law in the pursuit of its goals abroad;
41.  Appreciates that China is the biggest contributor of peacekeeping troops among the permanent members of the UNSC, thanks mostly to its rapidly modernising navy; welcomes, in this connection, the increased cooperation with the EU in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden; calls on China, as a permanent UNSC member, to cooperate in a responsible way with the international community on important global security concerns, such as the situation in Syria and Iran;
42.  Recognises China's responsibility both to provide security to its citizens and to assume a role in promoting peace and stability in the world, and welcomes its increased participation in the UN; calls, however, for the Chinese side to show more transparency and cooperate more closely with the EU and the UN on these issues, and for it to avoid isolation in the development of its foreign policy;
43.  Calls on China to review its policy of ‘non-interference in countries’ internal affairs' in cases of severe breaches of international humanitarian law;
44.  Welcomes the EU-China dialogue initiated in July 2012 on the Common Security and Defence Policy; proposes that this dialogue be extended to include the entire Asia-Pacific region;
45.  Asks China to dispel growing international concerns about its non-transparent military budget;
46.  Underlines the global importance of the South China Sea, through which one third of the world's trade passes; is alarmed at the escalating tension and therefore urgently appeals to all the parties involved to refrain from unilateral political and military actions, to tone down statements and to settle their conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea by means of international arbitration in accordance with international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, in order to ensure regional stability;
47.  Is seriously worried about the escalating tensions between China and Japan; appeals strongly to China and Japan to combat perceptions of one another as mutual enemies, and considers regrettable their failure to use the 40th anniversary of their diplomatic relations for constructive negotiations;
48.  Calls, in view of the European Union's significant interests in the security and stability of East Asia, on all parties concerned (China, Japan and Taiwan) to demonstrate restraint and to take steps to calm the situation on the disputed islands; urges all parties concerned to settle disputes peacefully in a spirit of cooperation and in compliance with international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and agree on de-escalating measures of engagement in the event of unforeseen incidents;
49.  Takes note of Taiwan's initiative with a view to reaching a consensus on a code of conduct for the East China Sea and the establishment of a mechanism allowing all sides to cooperate in the joint exploitation of the region's natural resources, including capacity for the generation of electricity from renewable sources;
50.  Notes that China's role in the cooperation between the two parties on the Korean Peninsula is vital and calls on the PRC more actively to seek enhanced cooperation between the North and the South;
51.  Notes, and considers it regrettable, that the survival of the dictatorial and repressive North Korean regime depends essentially on China; welcomes China's responsible behaviour in voting in favour of the UNSC's strong condemnation on 15 April 2012 of the failed rocket launch by North Korea, widely considered as an attempted ballistic missile test; looks forward to China continuing to take responsibility for stability on the Korean Peninsula, a swift resumption of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear threat, and, above all, a drastic improvement in the day-to-day living conditions of North Korean citizens brought about through Chinese incentives;
52.  Notes China's growing role in the Central Asian region through trade, economic and energy projects; considers that China can play a major role in the development of countries in Central Asia and calls on the PRC to promote better relations between states there as a pivotal step towards regional cooperation; remarks that China's main objectives within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are to achieve peace and stability in Central Asia by collectively combating the so-called ‘three evils’ of extremism, separatism and terrorism; notes China's great strategic and economic interest in the region through the exploitation of its vast oil and gas reserves and the connection of Central Asia to China's coastline via railways and highways;
53.  Welcomes the developing ties between China and Afghanistan, with talks taking place at a senior leadership level for the first time in history; considers that China can play a pivotal role in stabilising Afghanistan through a soft power approach and urges the development of close cooperation between the EU and China on this issue;
54.  Observes that the new American strategy of renewed focus on Asia is perceived by the Chinese leadership as an attempt by the USA to contain China's rapid economic and political ascension; encourages China and the USA to avoid tensions and an arms race in the Pacific; urges China to ensure freedom of circulation on the seas;
55.  Believes that very serious consideration should be given to the economic, social and environmental impact of increasing investment by China in developing countries;
56.  Notes that the increasing Chinese presence in Africa has contributed to economic development, with a particular focus on infrastructure projects; appreciates the Chinese leadership's acknowledgement of the serious criticism of its imbalanced, raw-material-centred African policy during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing on 20 July 2012, as demonstrated by its current open promotion of a diversification of its activities on the African continent; welcomes the pledge by State and Party leader Hu Jintao at this FOCAC meeting of a record credit of USD 20 billion to African countries over the next three years for developing their infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and SMEs; welcomes the support expressed by China for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and encourages the Chinese authorities to follow the global trend towards more transparency and to increase their concrete commitments in this area; calls on the EU to remain vigilant about the political, economic, social and environmental impact of China's growing investments in Africa;
57.  Is concerned that the increasing Chinese presence in Africa has led to grave social tensions, but welcomes the fact that Chinese companies have expressed their willingness to place greater emphasis on corporate social responsibility in their African activities; urges the Chinese authorities to anchor their policies in Africa on the principles of, and respect for, human rights, the promotion of sustainable development and human security;
58.  Takes note of China's increasing involvement in the exploitation of natural resources in Latin America, with Chinese imports of such resources having increased by more than 50 %;
59.  Encourages China, the world's biggest emitter of carbon dioxide, to play a more proactive and constructive role in promoting cooperation within the global community in order to tackle climate change; welcomes the White Paper issued by the Chinese authorities in November 2011 on the policies adopted and action taken to combat climate change and calls for it to be implemented swiftly;
60.  Notes that people-to-people contacts can play a crucial role in reaching a better mutual understanding both between China and the EU and between China and some of its other partners, such as the USA; welcomes, in this connection, the programmes intended to facilitate mobility between China and the EU;
61.  Urges China to make it an absolute priority to ensure legal certainty for foreign companies, by upholding the principles of equality, reciprocity and corporate social responsibility;
62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the EEAS, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the accession and candidate countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese National People's Congress, the Taiwanese Government and the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan.

(1)
OJ L 250, 19.9.1985, p. 2.

(2)
OJ L 6, 11.1.2000, p. 40.

(3)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0218.

(4)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0017.

(5)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0334.

(6)
OJ C 305 E, 14.12.2006, p. 219.

(7)
OJ C 67 E, 18.3.2010, p. 132.

(8)
OJ C 305 E, 11.11.2010, p. 9.

(9)
OJ C 199 E, 7.7.2012, p. 185.

(10)
OJ C 296 E, 2.10.2012, p. 137.

(11)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0301.

(12)
OJ C 285 E, 21.10.2010, p. 80.

(13)
OJ C 169 E, 15.6.2012, p. 81.

(14)
OJ C 288 E, 25.11.2006, p. 59.

(15)
OJ C 157 E, 6.7.2006, p. 471.

(16)
OJ C 99 E, 3.4.2012, p. 118.

(17)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2011)0474.

(18)
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0257.